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Abstract 
Purpose: The study is aimed to research the means and patterns of masculinity constructing in the working-class culture 
of modern Russia. Both the practices of producing its multiple forms in daily interaction and the stable structures of 
social inequality, which consolidate gender order at the institutional level, have been considered. The article also 
provides an analytical review of current studies of the working-class masculinity regimes in post-industrial societies.  
Methodology: The empirical base of the research is represented by the mass survey of 1534 respondents living in the 
Ural Federal District of Russia. The participants were working-class young people aged 16 to 29 years and occupied in 
the field of industry, technical maintenance, and customer service. The processing of research results was carried out 
using a statistical package IBM SPSS Statistics Version 20. 
Main Findings: It was found that the remaining structural disproportion between sectors of the economy in the level of 
remuneration and the gender composition of workers determines translation and reproduction of the male breadwinner 
pattern that has power in the family on the basis of control over economic resources.  
Applications of this study: The results of the study can be used in the teaching of sociology, gender studies, and 
cultural studies; it can also be applied by local policymakers while developing social policy programs targeted on the 
regarded social group.  
Novelty/Originality of this study: In the current research we have examined a specific group at the intersection of three 
stratification features: social class (the working class representatives), gender (men’s and women’s view of the 
masculine construct) and age (the youth of three age cohorts). The attention was paid both to the cultural production of 
multiple forms of masculinity and to the continued dominance of social inequality and suppression’ structures. 
Keywords: Working-class, Working-class Youth, Masculinity, Gender, Gender Regime, Hegemonic Masculinity. 
INTRODUCTION 
Studies of masculinity as one of the research directions of gender sociology focus on the everyday life of the working 
class in the late 1970s. By that time the post-industrial transformation destroyed the traditional foundations of men 
dominance in this social environment. Gender regimes of the Russian working class rarely become study objects while 
Russian sociologists also point to the crisis of the traditional model of masculinity caused by the negative consequences 
of deindustrialization in the 1990s. It led to an increase in destructive physical practices of alcoholization, narcotization, 
and violence (Zdravomyslova, Temkina, 2002; Tartakovskaya, 2002; Vanke, 2014: 154). At the same time, the 
reductionist interpretations of the working class are criticized in the current discourse of gender studies; the focus is 
shifted to the postulation of its multiple forms and practices of embodiment in everyday life.  
The discussion in this problem field unfolds within the framework of two conceptual directions: a discursive 
constructivist approach emphasizing the fluid, procedural nature of gender differences as derivatives of everyday 
practices in a specific local context, and an approach focusing on the importance of generally accepted categorizations, 
such as class, gender, and ethnicity, for the consolidation and reproduction of social inequality structures in modern 
capitalist societies (McDowell, 2004: 46). Based on the methodological aspects of our study, the second position seems 
to be more relevant.  
In this article, we will focus on the forms of embodiment of the working class masculinity in modern Russia. The 
research objective is to study the means and patterns of masculinity constructing in the working-class culture within the 
social context of a provincial city. We will pay attention both to the cultural production of multiple forms of masculinity 
(variable, fragmented and often contradictory gender constructs embodied in everyday discourses and practices) and to 
the continued dominance of social inequality and suppression’ structures (relatively stable gender orders reproduced at 
the institutional level 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Updating of the research of masculinity regimes in the last third of the twentieth century was due to a change in the 
social position of women in the post-industrial society, which problematized the male breadwinner dominant and 
normative pattern. In the late 1970s, the working class was observed as a carrier of conservative ideology in the 
conventional discourse on gender roles. However, at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, empirical studies showed that the 
men’s gender attitudes in this social group had also undergone changes and fragmentation (Segal, 1990). At that time 
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arguments regarding the defining markers of the construct of the working-class masculinity concentrated around manual 
labor, the workplace, and wages (Connel, 1991: 142). The problem statement of the working class masculinity belongs 
to the British author A. Tolson (Tolson, 1977). Among the early studies of this problem works of M. Donaldson should 
be noted. Using the comparative analysis of four English-speaking countries, he came to the conclusion that masculinity 
in the culture of the working class was formed at the intersection of two decisive factors: everyday family-household 
practices and the workplace (Donaldson 1987). Some left-leaning studies have examined how the everyday masculine 
culture of industrial enterprises forms and reproduces class subordination (Willis, 1979), constructs and translates 
patriarchal order (Cockburn, 1983) and alienated sexuality (Lippert, 1977).  
Neoliberal capitalism has changed the conditions, the organizational model, and the interaction’s macro-policy in the 
workplace. Having lost hope of secure employment in the industrial sector, men were forced to move into the service 
sector. In addition, they lost the ability to reproduce the customary model of masculinity based on the value of physical 
labor, salaries and the subordinate position of women in the household. Retail and fast-food work required a “service 
with a smile” ignoring the customers’ rude or neglect, tolerance of permanent control, obedience to bosses, and control 
over fleshlessness and sexuality, which contradicted the notions of masculinity prevailing in the work environment 
(Nixon, 2009). Trying to distance from routine service work requiring so-called “emotional labor” and servility, men 
refused this available type of unskilled labor or left such employment quickly (Lindsay, McQuaid, 2004; Roberts, 2013). 
On the other hand, employers preferred to hire women defining the behavioral signals and external attributes of working-
class masculinity as a potential threat (McDowell, 2004: 51). Therefore, the post-industrial transformation in Western 
Europe and the United States put men from this social class in an even more disadvantageous position than women due 
to their external attributes, gender attitudes, and attitudes to power and submission. There was an increase in violence, 
xenophobia and alcohol abuse, which played a compensatory role in supporting the crumbling masculinity model. In 
turn, this led to moral panic and the demonization of “white working-class men” in the media and scientific discourse, 
which has persisted and worsened at the present time. 
The need for sociological attention to these processes and the development of effective solutions for the social policy has 
caused an increased interest in masculinity and the emergence of new more subtle analytical models. A significant role 
in the formation of modern axiomatics of this research field was played by the works of R.Connell. Having 
problematized the stable concepts of “gender roles” and “identities”, the author considers masculinity as a socially 
constructed and temporally changeable form of a life project that transforms the bodily differences of men and women 
into “gender” as a social process. The construction of multiple models of masculinity as gender varieties is realized and 
can be found in social practices at different levels: personal, physical, cultural or institutional. In Connell’s works the 
differences between “hegemonic” masculinity (socially dominant but not necessarily the most common) and protest one 
subordinate to discredited or suppressed forms (homosexual masculinity) are identified and argued (Connel, 1991). 
Despite recognition by the scientific community, the concept of “hegemonic masculinity” has been criticized for narrow-
mindedness and reductionism (Whitehead, 2002). Researchers emphasize that the apparent internal unity of this model is 
actually a collection of conflicting elements (Demetriou, 2001: 349); in addition, in each individual historical period, 
there is more than one version of the dominant form of masculinity (Anderson, 2005). Taking into account the criticism, 
we believe that the Connell’s theory retains its value as a research tool, as it includes both an analysis of the structural 
relations of power and the diverse everyday gender practices. 
In the current discourse of gender studies, positive changes are noted in the adaptation of the dominant forms of 
working-class masculinity to the requirements of the service sphere. It is claimed that the nature of service labor no 
longer poses a threat to masculinity, “many working-class men find themselves in this kind of work,” and successful 
communication with a client brings a sense of work satisfaction (Lupton, 2006: 117). At the same time, the long-
established construct of masculinity is still in the working-class men’s minds as a model sample. It can be evidenced by 
recent studies that point at the avoiding practice of “serving” to clients and the continued desire for physical work at 
retail enterprises (Roberts, 2013: 675).  
METHODOLOGY  
An analysis of relevant approaches to the study of gender and class issues intersection shows the applicability of using 
the methodology of “agency within the structure” proposed by R. Settersten and L. Gannon. It allows combining a 
holistic algorithmic approach (when the life course is considered as organized integrity within structurally defined 
characteristics) with the hermeneutical outlook in the study of biography as a set of specific events, ways of their 
legitimation and reflection by working-class youth (Settersten, Gannon, 2005). The combination of approaches provides 
an opportunity to carry out a deep sociological analysis of the relations between the macro-social and personal aspects of 
masculinity construction. It helps to look at the structural forming factors and a lot of affective flows generated by 
specific situations of social interaction.  
A place of the new working class in the social structure of Russian society and western approaches to its 
conceptualization has been analyzed in our recent book (Gavrilyuk, 2019). It was revealed that in the Soviet and post-
Soviet tradition it was customary to oppose the class and stratification approaches since the first one was associated with 
Marxism exclusively. This led to a substitution of notions in Russian sociology: the “middle class” was interpreted as a 
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stratum, and the “working class” was replaced by euphemisms (for example, the “base segment” in the works of T. I. 
Zaslavskaya (Zaslavskaya, 1997). In modern Russian sociology the question of the criteria and the main features of the 
working class, which make it possible to draw a clear distinction between it and other social groups, have not been 
raised. 
Within the framework of the study, the working class is considered as a group of employees who are not involved in 
management and do not have property rights in the organization where they work; they are employed in all areas of 
material production and service; their work is routinized and divided into standardized algorithm-fueled segments and 
has quantitative standardization of results. There are the criteria for separating the working class from other classes and 
stratification groups: attitude to property, participation in management at a particular enterprise, and content of work. 
The internal differentiation of the modern working class is associated with the influence of factors such as the form of 
employment, which determines the degree of employment’s stability; the presence or absence of social guarantees (from 
permanent employment to illegal precarious work); employment sphere (employed workers in the real sector of the 
economy, including commodity production in the field of agriculture, and workers employed in the service); income 
level; the degree of routine labor (from clearly regulated, standardized to some degree of freedom in decision-making); 
lifestyle and cultural capital (from groups whose lifestyle and cultural practices are close to the middle class to 
marginalized and socially excluded groups). 
Having analyzed a specific problem of this article we move away from the binary contrast between masculine and 
feminine and concentrate attention on the theoretical assumption of multiple gender models in modern culture included 
in the working environment. The specific social group was examined at the intersection of three stratification features: 
social class (the working class representatives), gender (men’s and women’s view of the masculine construct) and age 
(the youth of three age cohorts) (Hancock, 2007; Jackson, Berkowitz, 2005; Lee, Waithaka, 2017). At the empirical 
level, the most general structures of the gender order in the family sphere and in the workplace were analyzed: men’s 
normative social roles, stereotypes of everyday performance of men’s gender roles, and gender restrictions and 
privileges. 
The empirical basis of the research is presented by the mass survey of young working-class representatives from 
different occupation spheres. The data collection was carried out from April until July 2018 in the Ural Federal District 
of Russia including three major cities (Ekaterinburg, Tyumen, Kurgan) and typical rural settlements of this area. 
Participants were 1534 emerging adults, a target multilevel sample type was implemented on four criteria – the age 
range from 16 to 29 divided into cohorts of 16-19 (33%), 20-24 (33.4%) and 25-29 (33.6%), according to the standard of 
official Russian statistics; gender - men (50.3%) and women (49.7%); place of living – city (76.2%) and countryside 
(23.8%) of the Ural Federal District; occupation sphere – commodity production, including agricultural sphere (45.2%) 
and in the service sector (54.8%). Participants in the study were selected randomly from the panel. Since we had taken 
only employed part of working-class youth as an object under study, the survey was conducted mostly at the workplaces 
by the prior arrangement with the management of companies. The younger cohort of the sample aged 16 – 19 was 
questioned at the places of study (vocational education institutions), but in so doing, only employed part of students was 
selected to take part in the research. Participants were informed about the purpose and length of the study, the content of 
the questions and the intended use of the data. None of them was paid or provided with other compensation in return for 
their participation.  
The processing of the research results was carried out using a statistical package IBM SPSS Statistics Version 20. The 
main types of statistical analysis of quantitative research data (frequency analysis and contingency table analysis) were 
used to identify general trends. Frequency tables with ordinal and nominal scales have been described. To determine the 
presence of correlation in the contingency tables, the statistical criterion χ2 (Pearson's chi-squared test) has been used, 
DISCUSSION / ANALYSIS  
Social Positions Based on Gender Differences 
Empirical evidence indicates the presence of the following significant markers of the traditional gender order in the 
working-class culture of modern Russia such as a man’s ability to provide for his family, initiate romantic relationships 
and play the traditional role of romantic “courtship” to a girl. Other parameters related to constructing gender into 
everyday practices and institutional constraints were assessed less warranted by respondents (see Figure 1). 
The continuing contradiction between the patriarchal society’s structure and women’s career intentions is evident in the 
analysis of the working-class youth’s attitude to two mutually exclusive statements. The vast majority of respondents 
(93.6% agree and 59.9% show strong agreement) believe that “a man should earn more than a woman to keep his 
family,” but with the fact that “men dominate in our society; women have little chance to make a career” only 27.3% 
agree, another 30.6% of respondents partially agree. It follows that young people are not fully grasping the connection 
between the patriarchal order which they support in the workplace (higher incomes for men imply fast promotion and 
better positions in the organizational hierarchy) and the problem of the “glass ceiling” in women's careers. 
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Figure 1: Distribution of answers to the question: “Do you agree with the following statements?” (% of the number of 
respondents) 
No gender differences were found among respondents who disagree with the need for men’s financial dominance. 
Moreover, the working-class young women are more confident in the need to maintain and reproduce this key 
foundation of patriarchy (63.3% of women and 56.5% of men fully agree with the statement about the role of men as 
“breadwinners”). That confidence strengthens with the increase of age: slightly less than 30% of respondents in the age 
cohorts of 15–19 and 20–24 fully agree with the statement; in the age cohorts of 25–29 confidence increases to 42.5%. 
The normative pattern of the breadwinner is the strongest among young people living in rural areas (95% of respondents 
support it; 66.1% of them fully share the attitude put in this statement, while 58% of urban working youth show absolute 
solidarity with it). 
 
Figure 2: The real income level of the working-class youth (% of the gender group) 
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In assessing the statement of men’s dominance in society and women's little chances of career progression there were no 
significant differences in gender, place of residence and employment. However, young people's confidence in the 
inevitability of a patriarchal order increases as they are growing-up (41.6% in the older age cohort fully agree with the 
statement, while in the younger group only 23.5% agree with that; in the middle age cohort of 20-24 (the period of 
professionalization and the beginning of a career) the level of agreement is reduced to 16.4%). 
The indicated above respondent’s positions have structural grounds, which are confirmed by data on their real income 
level. Figure 2 shows a significant gender pay gap in workforce positions (but not only the competitive and attractive 
managers’ positions and highly qualified specialists, as it is commonly believed). 
At the same time, the gender distribution of workers in the industrial sectors and services varies about 70/30 (see Figures 
3 and 4).  
 
Figure 3: Gender distribution of young workers in 
the industry and technical maintenance (% of the 
number of respondents employed in this field) 
 
Figure 4: Gender distribution of young workers in 
the customer service (% of the number of 
respondents employed in this field) 
The persisting structural imbalance between economic sectors in the rate of salary and gender composition of 
workers (46.2% employed in the service have salaries below 300 US dollars, and 37.8% employed – below 450 US 
dollars; mostly women) determines the translation of the normative attitude on the reproduction of the breadwinner 
pattern, who has power in the family on the basis of control over economic resources. Consequently, having the 
same class status, men and women, engaged in routine labor, still have non-equal financial opportunities. At the 
same time, only 14.6% of respondents have an essential belief in natural gender inequality based on the intellectual 
supremacy of men over women. Less than half (43.8%) believe that men and women have equal intellectual abilities 
and about the same number of respondents (41.7%) do not dare to make their attitude clear to this issue. 
Gender Relations in a family 
The analysis of youth attitudes to issues of everyday men’s dominance in the family sphere focuses on assessing the 
compulsory component of the traditional patriarchal family – domestic woman’s work. Studies by a number of 
Western authors indicate that a new form of masculinity is emerging as emotional sensitivity and involvement, 
respect for a woman, and an egalitarian position regarding family roles. A key parameter is man’s participation in 
household and child care (Gill, 2003). Nevertheless, despite the rejection by most western countries of the 
patriarchal family model and almost universally equal participation of women in the labor market, studies show that 
women do most of the household chores (Thébaud, 2010). As a rule, women do routine work at a strictly defined 
time, excluding the possibility of moving it in time (for example, cooking) (Coltrane, Shih, 2010). Men, on the other 
hand, are responsible for those types of domestic work that are performed sporadically and can be delayed (for 
example, minor repairs). It gives them more time for leisure activities (Craig, 2006). Russian authors also note a 
greater gender imbalance in the male worker's attitudes regarding family responsibilities compared with the middle 
class (Meshcherkina, 2002; Lipasova, 2017). So, in the study of A. Lipasova, it is noted that beliefs about desirable 
gender roles in working families often do not correspond to the real situation. Men interviewed by the author 
declared the “protector” and “breadwinner” models as normative, but in reality, the heads of families did not always 
correspond to these ideal types showing irresponsibility, while their wives had to work in a “double-shift” 
(Lipasova, 2017). 
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Among the participants in our survey, a significant differentiation of views is manifested (Table 1). The results of 
the study show that young people are still interested in maintaining the patriarchal model for domestic work 
distribution. Representatives of the older age cohort who already have experience of marriage or cohabitation are 
also more inclined to agree with the statement about cleaning and cooking as “women's work”. There are no 
differences between rural and urban youth in assessing this issue. 
Table 1: Distribution of answers to the question of agreement with the statement “Household, cleaning, and cooking 
– woman’s work” (% by respondents’ groups) 
Youth groups Agree Partially agree Disagree Total 
By gender groups 
Men 41.1 41.5 17.4 100.0 
Women 24.4 48.5 27.1 100.0 
By age cohorts 
Age of 15–19 27.3 48.1 24.6 100.0 
Age of 20–24 28.5 46.9 24.6 100.0 
Age of 25–29 42.5 40.0 17.5 100.0 
Respondents’ groups by place of residence 
City 32.7 44.6 22.7 100.0 
Village 33.3 46.1 20.6 100.0 
Total by the respondents’ array 32.9 45.0 22.1 100.0 
Masculinity Constructs in Everyday Interactions 
Further, we pay attention to the masculinity constructs in the sphere of everyday interactions embodied in the 
attitudes of the new working-class youth. 
Table 2: Distribution of answers to the question of agreement with the statement “A man should court to a girl, 
break the ice, and get attention” (% by respondents’ groups) 
Youth groups Agree Partially agree Disagree Total 
By gender groups 
Men 53.0 39.9 7.1 100.0 
Women 69.1 25.8 5.1 100.0 
By age cohorts 
Age of 15–19 58.5 33.7 7.8 100.0 
Age of 20–24 57.4 37.2 5.4 100.0 
Age of 25–29 67.0 27.9 5.1 100.0 
Respondents’ groups by place of residence 
City 59.4 33.6 7.0 100.0 
Village 66.2 30.7 3.1 100.0 
Total by the respondents’ array 61.0 32.9 6.1 100.0 
As Table 2 shows, the conflicting expectations of women are observed not only in the above analysis of the 
dilemmas of female professional self-fulfillment and adherence to the “breadwinner” model in the family but also in 
assessing the significance of everyday communication rituals. A much more pronounced desire for a conventional 
pattern of gender interaction of women compared with young men is manifested in the assessment of the statement 
“A man should court to a girl, break the ice, and get attention”: almost 70% of them expect conventional “courtship” 
and special attention from a man; among the young men about half are ready for these actions. 
Gender standardization of everyday practices was also revealed by analyzing respondents' attitudes to a number of 
evaluative judgments corresponding to stereotypes about hegemonic masculinity in a given social environment: 
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everyday violence (a fight as a common and “normal” practice of resolving conflict situations between men) and 
fears about excessive care of appearance (A “man” should not give too much attention to his appearance, as this is 
an indirect marker of homosexuality). The survey results indicate that women generally are not inclined to 
normalize violence in the men’s environment: 60% of them do not agree with the statement “A fight is a 
conventional way of clearing the air between men” (a little more 30% of men do not support this statement). About 
a quarter of male respondents believe that men’s violence is inevitable and normal; more than 40% “partially agree” 
probably appealing to take into account the context of a particular conflict situation. 
The respondents’ opinions regarding the men’s appearance are divided. About 20% of respondents of both sexes 
fully agree with the statement “A man should not make much effort in personal caring”, man more often choose the 
alternative answer “partially agree” (52%), women – “disagree” (39.9%) and “partially agree” (38.6%). In general, 
the pattern that is conventional for the Russian working class is preserved: women would like their partners to 
implement the increased focus on personal caring. However, young men are not sure whether increased attention to 
appearance is combined with the dominant masculinity construct in the work environment (exceptions are visiting 
gym, tattoo). Interestingly, this opinion is least supported by the most mobile age cohort of men aged 20-24 (only 
13.3%), while among the group of young adults aged 25-29, more than 30% agree with the statement. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, the analysis of quantitative data shows that conservatism and patriarchal family attitudes, which are attributed 
to the working class in mass culture, while remaining the dominant reference family model, nevertheless do not find 
unambiguous support of the vast majority of youth and have little to do with the real situation in working-class 
families. In view of the extremely low income, the classical patriarchal family model (a man is a breadwinner, a 
woman is a housewife) is rather an ideal-typical construction, accessible only to the middle class in Russia. Having 
the same class status, men and women of the working class, engaged in routine labor, still don’t have equal financial 
opportunities. It means that salaries in the service sector, where women are the majority, are still much lower than in 
industry, mining, and construction. Consequently, economic factors reinforce the conditions for the reproduction of 
structural men’s dominance practices in the family sphere, stipulating the preservation of a positive normative 
attitude towards maintaining the breadwinner pattern who has power in the family on the control over economic 
resources. Therefore, the statement of one of the first researchers of the working class masculinity A. Tolson, 
relating to the end of the 1970s, has not lost its relevance and is still reflected in the collective attitudes of working 
youth: “In our society, the main focus of masculinity is the wage” (Tolson, 1977: 58). 
The implementation of the masculine model of behavior in everyday practice is assessed by respondents 
ambiguously. The survey identified the most common trends, but this problem requires a more in-depth analysis 
using qualitative methods. The desire of women for the conventional pattern of romantic “courtship” does not fully 
correspond to the model of masculinity that dominates among young men of the working class. Almost 40% of 
working-class women do not find the contradiction between masculinity and personal caring, but most young men 
still have doubts, considering increased attention to appearance as a threat to their masculinity. Also, most women 
are not inclined to normalize violence as part of the masculinity construct, while two-thirds of men consider fighting 
to be a normal way to resolve conflicts. In this regard, it is possible to speak about a tendency to the difference of 
the expectations of young men and women in the sphere of daily behavior and communication: the most part of 
young men still tends to hegemonic masculinity model for the working class (manual work, physical force, brutal 
appearance, demonstrative insubordination of the power, domination over the woman), while young women, 
accepting the patriarchal order and realizing the position of it in general, are ready to the execution of their gender 
role in the case of financial support and protection from their men; moreover, the abovementioned indirect features 
are not the indicators of masculinity from their point of view. 
LIMITATION AND STUDY FORWARD 
The survey identified the most common trends, but this problem requires more in-depth analysis using qualitative 
methods to understand working-class gender regimes of everyday culture. In the next stage of our research, the 
explanations should be given how the masculine models of behavior have been produced, transmitted, and changed 
in everyday practices.  
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